Understanding Recent Events in Niger: Part I of II
Niger's recent coup and its aftermath in context: neo-colonialism, the country's internal political challenges, geopolitics, mineral wealth, and the possibility of foreign intervention
This is the first of a pair of articles on Niger and its recent military coup. In this part we examine Niger’s economy, characterized by neo-colonial dynamics, and the political situation over the last few years, leading up to the July 2023 toppling of President Bazoum. In Part II we will discuss how civilian-military divisions over how to confront jihadist insurgency influenced the decision to overthrow the government, examine Niger’s upheaval in light of the New Cold War between the US and a Sino-Russian bloc, and discuss events in the country since the coup — including the possibility of regional military intervention.
In the last week of July, elements of the military in the West African nation of Niger (not to be confused with its wealthier, more populous southern neighbor, Nigeria) seized power from its elected President, Mohamed Bazoum. They then instituted a junta known as the National Council for the Safeguarding of the Homeland (CNSP). Bazoum’s overthrow is the latest in a long line of similar coups in Africa’s semi-arid Sahel region. In light of this, Western media coverage of the coup and its immediate aftermath has been relatively simplistic, depicting it largely as a fundamental clash between democracy and authoritarianism. Threats of intervention to restore Bazoum by the regional organization ECOWAS are similarly portrayed as motivated by a desire to strengthen parliamentary liberalism in the face of military dictatorship.
In its immediate wake, some Western outlets went so far as to attribute the coup to the personal ambitions of a single military officer, the former commander of Niger’s Presidential Guard, Abdourahamane Tchiani. According to these accounts, Tchiani fomented the President’s ouster over fears that Bazoum planned to replace him. Even if it is true that Bazoum intended such a move (and it seems quite plausible that he did), this one-dimensional explanation fails to account for why such a broad swath of the military leadership outside of Tchiani’s Presidential Guard ultimately acquiesced in the putsch or why much of the population has so far accepted it as well.
Niger’s recent coup was not just the result of Tchiani’s machinations, nor was it a manifestation of some abstract global struggle between dictatorship and democracy. Instead, there were significant structural factors behind the plotters’ decision to overthrow Bazoum and the eventual acceptance of this outcome by the rest of the military high command. Two such interrelated factors are particularly important. First, the Nigerien government’s loss of legitimacy under the rule of Bazoum’s Nigerien Party for Democracy and Socialism (PNDS), with the state sliding repressively toward virtual one-party control. And second, disagreements within ruling circles over the best course to take in battling a jihadist insurgency that has wracked Niger and the wider Sahel for years. Such divisions were exacerbated by Bazoum’s removal of key military officials in an attempt to consolidate his position. In what follows, then, we explore these two issues and examine broader dynamics intersecting with them: neo-colonialism, imperialism, and increasing geopolitical tensions. Without some analysis of these dimensions, any understanding of the coup and its implications and consequences remains necessarily incomplete.
The Political Economy of Neo-Colonialism
Before examining the structural factors which influenced military leaders’ decision to replace Bazoum, it is worth briefly exploring Niger’s economic situation. Above all, Niger is a desperately poor country. Out of a population of around 25 million, roughly 10 million, or just over 40%, of Nigeriens live on less than $1.90 per day. The government’s budget is projected at a paltry $5.5 billion (in comparison, the US fast casual cafe chain Panera Bread has an annual revenue of $5.7 billion). Until the coup, the state expected nearly half of this budget, $2.2 billion, to come from foreign aid and other external assistance. Indeed, the nation presents a classic case of neo-colonialism, with its development stunted by unequal exchange with the West. Like many Third World countries suffering under neo-colonialism, Niger possesses a Janus-faced, dual economy. On the one hand, by far the largest economic sector is agriculture, with much of the population dependent on subsistence farming — with a mere 16% of the population located in urban areas. This subsistence agriculture is the foundation of Niger’s internal-facing economy, which also comprises livestock raising, small-scale industry, and retail commerce. Even as most Nigeriens work within this underdeveloped domestic-based sphere, the country is also integrated into international capital circuits through the export of commodities. Like much of Africa, Niger possesses abundant mineral wealth, which forms the basis of this second, outward-facing economic sphere. As in other cases of neo-colonialism, foreign multinational corporations control much of this mineral wealth, siphoning off the profits generated by Niger’s natural resources and channeling them to the West.
Like many other West African nations, Niger was once a French colony. France, of course, never intended its former colonies to be independent. The borders of current Francophone West African nations reflect administrative divisions within the former colonial federation of Afrique-Occidental Francaise — they do not correspond to the geographic and social requirements for economic self-sufficiency. States like Niger, Chad, and Mali are landlocked, with huge tracts of desert. Indeed, at the time of French West Africa’s independence in 1960, the former colonial masters believed that only one of the region’s colonies, Cote d’Ivoire, was economically viable as a sovereign state. Especially crucial was the disruption suffered by the fracturing of what had, under the French, functioned as a single economic bloc — with, for instance, interior regions serving as markets for coastal centers. After independence, poorer, desert-filled states like Mauritania, Mali, and Niger found themselves competing with the wealthier coastal nations — with all of the newly free countries battered by the vicissitudes of the global market.1
One of the most important macroeconomic powers available to a sovereign state is the ability to manage its currency. For the countries bearing the brunt of neo-colonial and imperialist dynamics, however, formal national sovereignty rarely equals genuine sovereignty in the area of monetary policy. Indeed, on the broadest level, every country besides the United States cedes some authority over monetary power to the American Federal Reserve for as long as the dollar is generally accepted as the global reserve currency. In the case of Niger and many of France’s other African ex-colonies, though, not only do the Fed’s decisions reverberate domestically but key currency decisions are directly influenced by a vestige of the colonial relationship with Paris: the CFA franc.
Technically the CFA Franc refers to two distinct currencies: the West African CFA Franc, used in Niger and seven other West African countries, and the Central African Franc, used in six Central African countries. In both cases, the use of the CFA franc means France and the European Central Bank (ECB, the central bank of the European Union) exercise outsize influence over these nations’ economies through several channels. Firstly, the CFA franc maintains a fixed exchange rate with the euro (before France adopted the European single currency this role was fulfilled by the French franc) — leaving the nations using it unable to independently change the value of their currency. Secondly, France guarantees the unlimited convertibility of the CFA franc to the euro, encouraging capital flight among wealthy Africans. Thirdly, the two central banks of the CFA franc zones (the Central Bank of West African States, or BCEAO, and the Bank of Central African States, BEAC) are required to keep at least half of their foreign exchange reserves in special accounts at the French Treasury. Lastly, the agreements governing the CFA franc require the participation of France’s Minister of Finance and head of the Bank of France (the country’s central bank) in meetings of the BCEAO and BEAC — giving representatives of the former colonial power a direct say in these institutions’ decisions.
However, paralleling the manifestation of anti-French political sentiment several of West Africa’s recent coups, the CFA franc’s existence has come under threat in recent years. Specifically, the West African CFA franc countries are in the midst of plans to jettison the currency in favor of a new one known as the eco (with its use ultimately extending to all of the ECOWAS member states). Although the peg to the euro would remain, the implementation of the eco would abolish many of the other mechanisms underlying France’s neo-colonial influence over the region. Plans to establish the eco date back to 2003 — eventually its projected member countries settled on 2020 as the year of its inauguration. This plan was scuttled by COVID; as of this writing, 2027 is the intended date for the new currency’s enactment. Unfortunately for its supporters, though, doubts remain even around this timeline. In designing the potential currency bloc, the member states laid out a set of fiscal criteria required for each country before the eco could finally launch: presently only Togo meets all of the stipulations.
The two most important mineral products exported by Niger are uranium and gold. Although the overall value of the country’s exports is tiny, the presence of these commodities nonetheless accounts for much of the nation’s significance to powers such as France, the US, Russia, and China.
Niger is the world’s seventh-largest producer of uranium. The French exercise ultimate control over much of Niger’s supply. The country contains two major uranium mines currently in operation, both in the northern desert region of Agadez. A consortium called SOMAIR operates the largest and most productive of these mines. The government of Niger owns one-third of SOMAIR through the state mining company, SOPAMIN. The state-owned French uranium conglomerate Orano (itself a subsidiary of the state-owned nuclear power firm Areva) owns the remaining two-thirds of the syndicate. Another consortium, SOMINA, operates the second mine, with SOPAMIN again controlling a 33% stake. Instead of the French, though, the remainder of the project (except a tiny slice owned by a Korean company) is held by Chinese firms, including the state-owned China National Nuclear Corporation. Until 2021, Niger also featured a third large-scale uranium mine — this one run by COMINAK, the majority of which was owned by the French, though Japanese and Spanish interests, along with the Nigerien state, also held stakes.
According to some studies, Nigerien uranium powers one out of every three lightbulbs in France. Meanwhile, back in Niger, a 2013 Oxfam report noted that, despite its plentiful uranium, nearly 90% of the population lacked access to electricity. Further, Niger largely depends upon Nigerian sources of electrical power, with 70% of the nation’s electricity imported from Nigeria. This dependence has resulted in widespread power outages since the junta’s ascendance, as Nigeria enforces harsh sanctions agreed upon by the regional organization ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States). Despite accounting for up to three-quarters of the country’s exports by value, uranium provides only around one-tenth of government revenues. The above Oxfam report calculated that Niger received only 13% of the export value of its uranium — a ratio which appears largely unchanged in the years since the report was written, even as the country’s uranium production declined in that period.
Although Niger is only the 27th largest gold producer in the world, the precious metal is still one of its largest exports. Unlike uranium mining, characterized by capital-intensive logistical networks connected to the nuclear industry, a large chunk of Niger’s gold production (perhaps as much as one-third) comes from small-scale artisanal mines. Largely unregulated and marked by informal labor arrangements, these mines are generally owned by local capitalists cooperating as compradors with foreign firms. Although dangerous, artisanal mining is an important source of relatively high-paying jobs in a deeply impoverished country. The sector provides far more employment than the more productive industrial mining projects controlled by foreign corporations — with 500,000 artisanal jobs against 4,000 industrial ones. However, it is also one of the foremost causes of aridification, turning previously healthy land into desert, in a region already suffering the widespread loss of fertile soil to desert due to climate change.
In contrast to its widespread artisanal gold mines, Niger boasts only a single large-scale industrial one. This mine is known as Samira Hill, located in the Tillaberi Region, in the hinterland of the nation’s capital, Niamey. Samira Hill is operated by a consortium called SML (Societe des Mines du Liptako). The Nigerien state holds a 20% stake in SML and owns the Samira Hill concession site. Two Canadian corporations, Endeavour Mining and Etruscan Resources, control the remainder of SML, with each firm maintaining a 40% share.
In addition to uranium and gold, experts believe Niger also contains up to five billion barrels of oil. If this upper-end estimate proves correct, Niger would have the 26th largest oil reserves in the world — roughly the same as Mexico, Oman, or Sudan. While these reserves are paltry compared to the hundreds of billions of barrels known to be under the surface of Venezuela or Saudi Arabia, they are nonetheless significant enough to attract the attention of major foreign energy companies. The most important of these foreign energy firms is China’s massive state-owned China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC). CNPC is the principal force behind the construction of a 1,200-mile (1,900 km), $4 billion pipeline stretching from Niger’s Agadem oil field to the port city of Cotonou in neighboring Benin. Before the coup and the impact of sanctions, investors expected the pipeline’s completion around the end of this year. When operational, the pipeline will bring Niger’s oil production up to 110,000 barrels per day (bpd), far higher than the present figure of 20,000 bpd. This past May, another Chinese energy giant, China Petroleum and Chemical Company (or Sinopec), also signed several agreements with Niger regarding potential oil and gas projects. The state projects this increase in oil production will bring a major increase in economic growth and government revenues. Such aspirations are, of course, threatened by the sanctions imposed by ECOWAS and the West, as well as by the possibility of military intervention undertaken by the former.
Niger’s Political Environment through July 2023
As noted above, one important factor through which we must view the CNSP’s assumption of power is the widespread loss of legitimacy suffered by Niger’s government during its control by Bazoum’s PNDS. The PNDS was founded in 1990 as a social-democratic party. Throughout its history, the party’s central figure has been its former longtime leader and Bazoum’s ex-mentor, Mahamadou Issoufou. In 2010, amid a constitutional crisis over term limits, a military coup overthrew President Mamadou Tandja. The resulting junta quickly paved the way for a return to civilian rule (a precedent suggesting the present CNSP is genuine about its three year timetable for a return to parliamentary democracy) and new elections were held in 2011. It was this election that gave Issoufou the presidency and brought the PNDS to power for the first time.
The PNDS’s 2011 ascendance coincided with NATO’s intervention in Libya, as the West and its allies toppled and murdered Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi. Issoufou’s administration advised against the assault on Libya, warning that it could unleash disastrous consequences on the entire region (though by 2015 the Nigerien president was pleading for Western intervention in the country as civil war raged). Like other critics of the operation, the PNDS leadership was unfortunately proven eminently correct: much of the impetus for the jihadist maelstrom afflicting Niger and the Sahel was provided by militants and arms that found their way south after the defeat of Gaddafi. Nonetheless, in the wake of NATO’s intervention, Issoufou decided to approach the West for aid in combatting the growing jihadist threat (preceded by spillover from a Tuareg rebellion in Mali) to Niger.
As the writer and expert on North Africa Rahmane Idrissa argues in a recent piece (from which we draw for much of the next four paragraphs), domestic political exigencies largely motivated Issoufou’s request. One of the central policies of the PNDS after its victory in 2011 was an increase in social spending on healthcare and education. But to finance these reforms, Niger needed external help in shouldering the burden of jihadist-induced chaos which exploded in the wake of Gaddafi’s demise. At the time, the party’s leaders saw the most logical source of such help as the United States and its European allies.
Despite the presence of at least 2,600 French and American troops, the jihadist threat to Niger remains intense. The failure of the PNDS’s bet on Western military aid has, as in neighboring countries, aggravated latent anti-Western, above all anti-French, sentiment — helping fuel momentum towards Bazoum’s deposal. Concurrently, the PNDS also suffered a loss of legitimacy from other sources. Particularly notable was the government’s increasing repression of civil society groups and opposition figures, coupled with a failure to root out endemic corruption.
On coming into power, Issoufou and the PNDS promised to stamp out corruption, long a scourge of public life in Niger. While the government made some initially promising moves in that direction, it ultimately had scant tangible results to back up its pledge. Indeed, the PNDS eventually used anti-corruption investigations as a cudgel with which to attack its opponents. In the 2016 presidential election, for instance, the most important opposition candidate, Hama Amadou of the Nigerien Democratic Movement (MODEN, a moderate Islamist and Pan-Africanist party), spent the campaign in jail. Amadou was an ally of Issoufou until he broke with the President in 2013. He was then accused of child trafficking in 2014, whereupon he fled to Burkina Faso. Upon his return in 2015 he was promptly arrested.
Along with the stick of anti-corruption charges, the PNDS also used the carrot of patronage and kickbacks to neutralize opposition. The party succeeded in dividing its opponents, splitting opposing parties as members were absorbed into the ruling coalition. The result of this twin approach was the emergence of a new, PNDS-dominated political balance in the country. This balance remained intact even after Issoufou left the presidency, with Bazoum, his handpicked successor, elected in 2021. By the time of the coup, the largest remaining opposition party was Amadou’s MODEN, with 19 seats in the National Assembly, as against 79 for the PNDS.
Civil society groups were likewise not strong enough to challenge the PNDS system. In 2022, activists formed a protest organization called M62 to struggle against the government and its close relationship with France. The state largely succeeded in repressing the group’s protests, though M62 now appears revitalized in the wake of the coup, holding widespread events supporting the CNSP and demanding an end to the French presence in Niger.
Even as the PNDS dominated Niger’s political scene, though, factional tensions surfaced within the party. In the months leading up to the coup strain mounted between Bazoum and his predecessor, Issoufu. Indeed, some reports question if the latter possessed foreknowledge of Bazoum’s fall — Issoufou was quite close with the CNSP’s leading personality, Tchiani. In particular, Issoufou was reportedly dissatisfied by Bazoum’s removal of several of his allies from key posts, especially in the country’s growing oil sector.
Bazoum’s alienation of Issoufou and his supporters deprived the president of an important political ally just as friction between the administration and the military ramped up. As we discuss below, elements of the military opposed Bazoum’s heavy reliance on Western support. But, in the last several months, he also antagonized the high command with a series of administrative decisions — perhaps undertaken, as with the removal of Issoufou’s associates from oil industry posts, to consolidate Bazoum’s base of support. Particularly significant in this regard: the removal in March of the head of the national gendarmerie (paramilitary police) and the chief of staff of the armed forces, Salifou Modi (now a leading figure in the junta); cuts to the budget of the elite Presidential Guard; and the forced retirement of six senior generals.
Check out Part II for more on the events in Niger: jihadist insurgency, New Cold War geopolitics, and the possibility of ECOWAS intervention.
The Fate of Africa, 69-70